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Empirical Research Paper
The world can be a threatening place. There are wars, pan-
demics, malicious governments, organized crime syndi-
cates, job losses, educational struggles, food insecurities, 
natural disasters, and petty crimes. One way that this 
diverse set of potential threats can be managed is through 
politics. This includes political and governmental institu-
tions that work to manage threat and mitigate their effects 
through various political policies (e.g., social welfare) and 
formal institutions (e.g., the armed forces). In its extreme, 
this is Hobbes’ Leviathan come to life: The state of nature 
is one of fear and a functioning government can manage 
that state of nature. Various policies and political beliefs 
can also help address threat and reduce feelings of fear. 
People turn to political beliefs that match their personality 
traits, predispositions, and ongoing epistemic and existen-
tial needs (Jost et al., 2009). One class of predispositions 
includes people’s feelings and experiences of threat 
(Adorno et al., 1950; Conway et al., 2020; Doty et al., 1991; 
Duckitt & Sibley, 2009; Lazarev et al., 2014; Wilson, 1973). 
Adopting specific political beliefs, such as beliefs that are 
particularly stable and rigid, may help reduce feelings of 
threat (Thórisdóttir & Jost, 2011).
We examined how different types of threat are associated 
with different types of political beliefs across a diverse array 
of countries. In doing so, we not only expand on the types of 
threat, political beliefs, and countries usually explored in the 
literature, but we also go beyond this by conducting a joint 
evaluation of all of these dimensions simultaneously. The 
results challenge a straightforward relationship between 
political beliefs and feelings of threat.
Politics and Threat
The links between political beliefs and feelings of threat form 
the crux of psychological theories of political ideology 
(Adorno et al., 1950; Conway et al., 2020; Duckitt & Sibley, 
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Theories link threat with right-wing political beliefs. We use the World Values Survey (60,378 participants) to explore how 
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2009; Jost et al., 2003; Onraet, Van Hiel, Dhont, & Pattyn, 
2013; Stenner, 2005). The motivated social cognition approach 
to ideology, for example, highlights existential motivations, 
especially as they manifest in perceptions and experiences of 
threat, both as a consequence and as a key predictor of right-
wing political beliefs (Jost et al., 2003, 2017).1 The idea is that 
right-wing beliefs help fulfill a variety of basic psychological 
motivations and needs, including those related to managing 
uncertainty and fear. Right-wing ideology’s links with the 
resistance to social change, maintenance of societal traditions, 
and the acceptance of inequality make it an ideal candidate to 
help manage fear and feelings of threat, even when the threat 
is not directly related to politics or specific political issues. As 
Jost et al. (2017, p. 326) put it, “When one confronts a world 
that appears dangerous and unpredictable, it is possible to find 
solace in the maintenance of what is familiar and known (the 
status quo) and entrust one’s fate to powerful, prestigious 
authority figures.” In other words, people adopt political 
beliefs that help them fulfill particular psychological motiva-
tions, and right-wing ideology may be particularly well suited 
to help people manage threat.
Consistent with the motivated social cognition approach, 
a recent meta-analysis across multiple measures of fear and 
existential threat finds that the association between threat 
and right-wing beliefs was small-to-moderate (depending on 
the precise measure; Jost et al., 2017; see also Onraet, Van 
Hiel, Dhont, & Pattyn, 2013). Other work (not summarized 
in the meta-analysis), has linked right-wing political beliefs 
with stronger physiological reactions to negative and threat-
ening stimuli and a general negativity bias (for a review see 
Hibbing et al., 2014; but see Bakker et al., 2020; Osmundsen 
et al., in press for reasons to doubt such physiological 
effects). On the basis of this literature (e.g., Jost et al., 2017), 
one might expect that the link between threat and right-wing 
beliefs is robust.
Expanding Stimuli and Samples
We suggest that a broad and general link between threat and 
politics is too simple. Although there are likely specific con-
ditions under which there is a robust link between threat and 
right-wing political beliefs, we suspect that when broader 
samples of (a) types of political beliefs, (b) types of threat, 
and (c) populations of participants are taken into account the 
link will be more fragile. In our work, we not only explore 
the relation between ideology and threat, but move beyond 
this to examine the link between different types of threat and 
different types of political beliefs among participants from a 
large sample of countries. Prior work has examined different 
types of threat and different types of beliefs. We build on this 
work by expanding the types of threat and examining the 
joint influence of the types of threat, types of political beliefs, 
and countries simultaneously. This helps identify the vari-
ability in the link between threat and politics across these 
three factors. This is consistent with calls for using broader 
and more representative arrays of stimuli and political sys-
tems in political psychology (Baron & Jost, 2019; Brandt & 
Crawford, 2019; Brandt & Wagemans, 2017; Kessler et al., 
2015) and psychology more broadly (Henrich et al., 2010). 
When researchers focus on a narrow range of stimuli or sam-
ples, heterogeneity between stimuli or samples is often 
missed and the size and consistency of effects are likely to be 
overestimated.
Multiple Dimensions of Political Beliefs
The first way we expand our test of the link between threat 
and politics is by considering cultural and economic dimen-
sions of political beliefs (Choma & Hodson, 2017). Although 
some scholars highlight a tight correspondence between cul-
tural and economic dimensions (Azevedo et al., 2019), there 
is a consensus that political beliefs can be split into corre-
lated, but theoretically independent dimensions that are 
related to cultural political beliefs (including the mainte-
nance of traditions and national boundaries) and economic 
policies and beliefs (including the maintenance of inequality; 
Crawford et al., 2017; Everett, 2013; Feldman & Johnston, 
2014; Johnston et al., 2017; Johnston & Ollerenshaw, 2020; 
Malka et al., 2019; Nilsson et al., 2019). Cultural and eco-
nomic dimensions of political beliefs may fulfill different 
psychological functions and so may have different relation-
ships with feelings of threat.
For example, right-wing beliefs in the cultural domain 
may be especially adept at addressing feelings of threat 
because of their close connection with the resistance to social 
change and social traditions. In contrast, right-wing eco-
nomic political beliefs may be less capable of addressing 
threat because they do not provide the same levels of cer-
tainty (e.g., economic markets can be uncertain). Instead, 
left-wing economic political beliefs may be better suited to 
address feelings of threat because the policies associated 
with these left-wing economic political beliefs tend to pro-
vide more certainty (e.g., via unemployment support). The 
idea is that because of the certainty embedded in right-wing 
cultural political beliefs and left-wing economic political 
beliefs, both beliefs are especially likely to help address peo-
ple’s perceptions and general feelings of threat. This line of 
thinking suggests that threat will be related to more right-
wing cultural political beliefs and more left-wing economic 
political beliefs. And this is what has been found (Feldman & 
Johnston, 2014; Johnston et al., 2017; Malka et al., 2014, 
2019; van Hiel et al., 2004). Our work directly builds on this 
prior work by investigating how multiple dimensions of 
political beliefs are related to multiple types of threat across 
multiple political systems.
Multiple Types of Threat
The second way we expand our test between threat and 
politics is by considering dimensions of threat (Crawford, 
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2017). Although some people may experience generalized 
feelings of threat (Onraet, Van Hiel, Dhont, & Pattyn, 
2013), oftentimes threat is experienced toward a specific 
target (e.g., Stephan & Renfro, 2002). For example, a per-
son who has experienced a job loss may be more prone to 
feelings of economic threat, but not toward the threat of 
potential crime. Conversely, a person may be quite threat-
ened by general criminal activity and have stable employ-
ment. To the extent that particular political beliefs are better 
at addressing some types of threat compared with others, 
the relationship between threat and politics should depend 
on the type of threat.
There is research consistent with this idea. For example, 
Jost and colleagues (2017) summarize data from a represen-
tative sample of the United States where participants were 
asked about their fear toward 73 different stimuli and also 
reported their political ideology. They found that rightists 
tended to report more fear of gun control, illegal immigra-
tion, and governmental corruption, whereas leftists tended to 
report more fear of climate change, pollution, and overpopu-
lation. Experimental studies, also conducted in the United 
States, have shown that threats of restricted health-care 
access, pollution, and corporate misconduct all increase sup-
port for leftist beliefs in the threatened domain (e.g., more 
leftist health-care beliefs following the threat to health-care 
access; Eadeh & Chang, 2019; see also Fiagbenu et al., in 
press). Other work finds that threat to society (broadly) 
increase right-wing authoritarianism, whereas the threat of a 
particularly competitive environment is associated with 
increased social dominance orientation (for a review Duckitt 
& Sibley, 2009). A common thread between the work by 
Eadeh and Chang (2019) and Duckitt and Sibley (2009) is 
that people adopt political beliefs that best address the threat 
they are experiencing. If right-wing beliefs are better able to 
address some threats (e.g., from violence) compared with 
others (e.g., from unemployment), then different threats will 
likely have different relationships with right-wing ideology. 
In particular, the association is likely to be stronger for threat 
that can be addressed by right-wing beliefs, but maybe neg-
ligible for threats that are beyond the reach of right-wing 
beliefs. A shortcoming of this prior work is that it primarily 
focuses on one particular political system (e.g., the United 
States, as in Eadeh & Chang, 2019). Our work builds on this 
prior work by expanding the types of threats considered and 
then assessing if these threat-politics associations are consis-
tent across multiple political systems.
Multiple Political Systems
A third way to expand tests of the link between threat and 
politics is by considering political beliefs within different 
countries and political systems. Political beliefs are not time-
less and stateless, but rather are situated in different histories, 
institutions, and cultures, which all may affect how the 
beliefs develop, are expressed, and address feelings of threat. 
Much of the work on threat and politics is from the United 
States, with some also coming from Western Europe. For 
example, only ~4% of the data from Jost and colleagues’ 
(2003) meta-analysis comes from outside of Western Europe, 
North America, Australia, and New Zealand, mirroring a 
common issue in psychological research (Henrich et al., 
2010). More data were from the United States than from all 
of the other countries combined (~75%). This makes it near 
impossible to understand if and to what extent the associa-
tions between threats and political beliefs differ across 
countries.
There is research that assessed the link between various 
existential motivations and political beliefs. Some of this 
work is conducted at the country-level or the state-level of 
analysis. For example, in one project indicators of threat at 
the country-level (e.g., poor unemployment, low GDP per 
capita) were associated with right-wing beliefs at the coun-
try-level (Onraet, van Hiel, & Cornelis, 2013; see also 
Conway et al., 2017). However, it currently remains unclear 
how such country-level results relate to individuals’ endorse-
ment of threat/political belief. Indeed, work that focuses on 
the country-level, state-level, or any aggregate level does not 
necessarily generalize to the individual- and psychological-
level of analysis (see discussions of the ecological fallacy or 
cross-cultural isomorphisms; e.g., Robinson, 1950; Van de 
Vijver et al., 2008). For example, cultural and economic 
political beliefs appear to be positively correlated at the 
country-level of analysis (Onraet, van Hiel, & Cornelis, 
2013), yet using similar data these beliefs appear to be nega-
tively correlated in many countries (Malka et al., 2019). This 
means that findings at the country-level are conceptually dif-
ferent and do not necessarily inform the psychological theo-
ries we are building on in this project.
This is not to say that the link between country character-
istics and individual-level political beliefs has not been 
explored at all. There are projects that have assessed how 
values of security are associated with political beliefs across 
a range of countries. In these projects, the link between 
security values and political beliefs is estimated at the indi-
vidual-level of analysis. Additional analyses then test if this 
individual-level association is similar or different across 
countries by testing whether characteristics of the country 
moderate the individual-level association between security 
values and political beliefs. That is, these projects test if 
people’s political psychology differs across countries. For 
example, in an analysis among Europeans, valuing security 
was associated with more right-wing identification in 
Western Europe, but more left-wing identification in Eastern 
Europe (Thorisdottir et al., 2007). This effect was later also 
confirmed outside of Europe (Malka et al., 2014). Analyses 
using this broader sample found that values of order and 
security are positively associated with right-wing cultural 
political beliefs, but that this association is largest among 
individuals in countries with high levels of human develop-
ment and ideological constraint (i.e., countries where 
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cultural and economic political beliefs are more highly 
intercorrelated; Malka et al., 2014). In contrast, values of 
order and security tend to be associated with left-wing eco-
nomic political beliefs and this association is smaller in 
ideologically constrained and non-Eastern European coun-
tries. Taken together, these results suggest that the link 
between valuing order and security and political ideology at 
the individual-level depends on the type of political beliefs 
and characteristics of the country. A clear downside of these 
studies for our purposes is that they assess people’s values 
using Schwartz’s Portrait Values Questionnaire (Schwartz 
et al., 2001), thus leaving it unclear if these patterns apply to 
the association between threat and political beliefs.
Country Characteristics
We sought to explore a wide range of country characteristics 
that might help us understand when threat is associated with 
particular political beliefs. Although some past studies have 
looked at country characteristics like the Human Development 
Index (HDI), location in Eastern Europe, ideological con-
straint, or traditionalism (Malka et al., 2014, 2019; 
Thorisdottir et al., 2007), this is a limited range of possible 
country characteristics. Countries can differ in a number of 
different ways not captured so far, including the quality of 
their institutions, the primary drivers of their economy, the 
levels of inequality, the levels of individualism/collectivism, 
and more. Given the broad range of ways countries can dif-
fer, we adopted a broad and purposefully exploratory 
approach (Jebb et al., 2017) that examined 26 country char-
acteristics drawn from political science, sociology, and 
cross-cultural psychology. This allows us to take an induc-
tive approach that pushes our knowledge of where the link 
between threat and political beliefs is more or less likely to 
emerge.
The specific country characteristics and the rationale for 
including them are in Table 1. Some of these characteristics 
tap into conceptually similar things (e.g., quality of govern-
ment) and so the rationale for such measures are included 
just once. We chose characteristics that have been mentioned 
in the literature (e.g., Malka et al., 2014, 2019; Thorisdottir 
et al., 2007), but also sought to expand the range of typical 
characteristics studied in this domain. That means that our 
rationale for including such measures ranges from tests of 
theoretical ideas posited in related literature (e.g., quality of 
government, HDI, ideological constraint) to much more 
exploratory rationales and curiosity. Predictions for country 
characteristics with firmer theoretical foundations are high-
lighted in gray in Table 1. We also elaborate more on these 
characteristics in the results.
The Current Study
The purpose of the current study is to explore how threat is 
associated with political beliefs when expanding on the types 
of threat, types of political beliefs, and countries under study. 
Although prior work has looked at these different domains, 
our key contribution is examining all of these different 
domains in the same study. This allows for a direct assess-
ment of the extent stimuli variation in types of threat, types 
of political beliefs, and countries under study affect our 
understanding of the association between threat and political 
beliefs. Focusing on one type of threat, political belief, or 
country could give a misleading impression about the consis-
tency of the associations between threat and polices.
We use data from the 6th wave of the World Values Survey 
(Inglehart et al., 2014) which includes measures of threats 
related to violence (e.g., war), neighborhoods (e.g., lack of 
security and crime in one’s neighborhood), the police (e.g., 
interference of the police and racism), economics (e.g., 
unemployment, lack of education), poverty (e.g., lack of 
cash, food, and medicine), and government surveillance.2 
The threats tap into several of the threats previously studied 
(e.g., economic, violence, and social threats; Doty et al., 
1991; Huddy et al., 2005; Onraet, Van Hiel, & Cornelis, 
2013; Onraet, Van Hiel, Dhont, & Pattyn, 2013), as well as 
threats less commonly considered (e.g., surveillance and 
police threats). Although our study is exploratory, based on 
our reading of the literature, and the idea that people will 
adopt the political beliefs that are perceived as best address-
ing a particular threat (Duckitt & Sibley, 2009; Eadeh & 
Chang, 2019), we formed four expectations:
1. We expect that threats related to economics and pov-
erty would be associated with more left-wing eco-
nomic political beliefs, because left-wing economic 
political beliefs are typically perceived to address 
threat in the domains of social security, unemploy-
ment, health, and the environment across countries 
(Seeberg, 2017).
2. We expect that threats related to violence and an inse-
cure neighborhood would be associated with more 
right-wing cultural political beliefs because right-
wing cultural political beliefs are typically perceived 
to address threats to law and social order across coun-
tries (Seeberg, 2017).
3. We expect that threats related to the police would be 
associated with more left-wing beliefs in the cultural 
domain because right-wing cultural political beliefs 
are often associated with law and social order across 
countries (Seeberg, 2017), which is not likely to help 
address the ongoing threat of the police.
4. We expect that the association between threat and 
politics will be moderated by the quality of the gov-
ernment, the countries’ history as a member of the 
Eastern Bloc, the economic conditions, and the ideo-
logical constraint in the country (see Table 1).
We do not have any expectations for how the threat of gov-
ernment surveillance will be associated with political beliefs, 
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Table 1. Country Characteristics and Rationale for Inclusion in the Study.
Country characteristic (source) Description Rationale
Corruption Perception Indexa 
(Norris, 2015)
Perceived levels of public sector 
corruption based on experts and 
opinion surveys
Threat may be more strongly associated with political 
beliefs that give governments power (e.g., economic 
left-wing beliefs) when a country has a well-
functioning government (Kay et al., 2008).Government Effectiveness 
Index (Kaufmann & Kraay, 
2019)
Perceptions and quality of public services
Governance Quality (Norris, 
2015)
Expert ratings of the quality of 
governance.
Democratic Governance Index 
(Norris, 2015)
A measure combining the extent of 
liberal democracy and the quality of 
government
Former member of Eastern 
bloc
Was the country a part of the USSR? Threat may be more likely to be associated with left-
wing economic political beliefs when the status quo is 
more left-wing on the economic dimension because 
threat motivates people to maintain the status quo 
(Thorisdottir et al., 2007).
Trust Index Proportion of people in the country 
reporting that “most people can be 
trusted.”
People may be less likely to turn to strangers, including 
the government, for help in countries with low levels 
of trust (Bergh & Bjørnskov, 2011). This may mean 
that the link between threat and left-wing economic 
political beliefs are less likely in low trust countries.
Human Development Index 
(United Nations, 2017)
Composite of life expectancy, education, 
and per capita income
Threat may be less associated with right-wing political 
views when economic conditions are poor because 
the economically threatening context makes everyone 
more right-wing (Sibley et al., 2012).
Gini Index (World Bank, 
2019d)
Extent of income inequality
Gender Inequality Index 
(United Nations, 2017)
Composite of reproductive health and 
gender inequality in political, education, 
and the labor market
Diversity Index, language 
(Forbes, 2012)
Employee diversity based on language Threat may be more strongly associated with right-
wing political beliefs when diversity attributed to 
immigration and multiculturalism is high (e.g., because 
it is a symbolic threat to the national identity; 
Morrison & Ybarra, 2009; Smeekes & Verkuyten, 
2014).
Diversity Index, country of 
birth (Forbes, 2012)
Employee diversity based on country of 
birth
Linguistic Diversity Index 
(UNESCO, 2009)
The probability that any two people 
selected would have different mother 
tongues
International Migrant Stock 
(United Nations, 2017)
Number of migrants in a country at a 
given time.
Freedom of Expression and 
Belief Index (Freedom House, 
2016)
Expert ratings of cultural, religious, and 
academic freedom
Threat may be more weakly associated with right-wing 
cultural political beliefs in countries with homogenous, 
strong religious norms because those norms make 
everyone more right-wing on cultural issues (Hoffarth 
et al., 2018).
Religious Freedom Index 
(Norris, 2015)
Composite measure of the state’s 
involvement in the regulation of religion
Religious Diversity Index 
(Johnson & Grim, 2018)
Extent one religion is prevalent or if 
there are many religions
Importance of Religion 
(Crabtree, 2010)
Percent indicating that religion is an 
important part of daily life
KOF Globalization Index (Gygli 
et al., 2019)
Composite of indicators that the 
country is politically and economically 
connected internationally
Lower levels of globalization are related to higher levels 
of nationalism (Ariely, 2012). This may weaken the 
link between threat and right-wing beliefs because 




Extent people from the country express 
individualistic versus collectivistic values
The relative individualism or collectivism norms in a 
country may affect the relationship between threat 
and political beliefs because it may be related to 




Extent people from the country express 
individualistic versus collectivistic values
 (continued)
6 Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 00(0)
Country characteristic (source) Description Rationale
Tightness Index (Gelfand et al., 
2011)
Extent a country has strong norms and 
low tolerance for deviant behaviors.
Threat may be more weakly associated with right-
wing cultural political beliefs in tight countries than 
in loose countries, because of the strength of norms 
(norms are clear and pervasive in tight cultures) and 
the strength of sanctioning (there is less tolerance for 
normative deviance in tight cultures; Gelfand et al., 
2006).
Percent agriculture (World 
Bank, 2019a)
Percent of total employment in 
agriculture
Mode of subsistence seems to influence how people 
socialize their children which may affect political 
expression. For example, in societies with more 
agriculture, people socialize their children more toward 
compliance (Kağitçibaşi, 2007) and in societies with 
more service jobs, people might be socialized to more 
expression of emotions (Van Hemert et al., 2007).
Percent industry (World Bank, 
2019b)
Percent of total employment in industry
Percent service (World Bank, 
2019c)
Percent of total employment in service
Climate Indexb (Van de Vliert, 
2007)
Extent climate deviates from 22°C Climate helps define constraints and affordances for 
specific cultural adaptations to the environment (Van 
de Vliert, 2007), such as agricultural techniques and 
self/other orientation (see Talhelm et al., 2014). Such 
cultural adaptions may be relevant for how people 
respond to threat. Prior work has linked it with harsh 
governance (Van de Vliert & Tol, 2014).
Ideological Constraint Average inter-item correlation of the 
political items in the study.
Threat may be more likely to be associated with 
right-wing economic political beliefs in a country with 
ideological constraint because they are more likely 
to be exposed to political discourse that constrains 
political attitudes on a single right-left dimension 
(Malka et al., 2014).
aHigher scores indicate less corruption. b Average temperatures were obtained from weatherbase.com. Index is calculated according to the following 
formula: (22-average hottest)2 + (22-average lowest)2. Predictions for country characteristics with firmer theoretical foundations are highlighted with 
gray.
Table 1. (continued)
in part because issues related to surveillance are not asked in 
issue ownership studies (Seeberg, 2017) and this threat is 
understudied more generally. Nonetheless, this type of threat 
is important to study due to its centrality in an increasingly 
surveilled world and its centrality to some political ideolo-
gies (e.g., libertarianism) and conspiracy theories. Although 
the threat of government surveillance was associated with 
right-wing beliefs in the United States (e.g., Jost et al., 2017), 
it is not obvious that this would generalize to other political 
contexts.
Although our expectations for the link between threat and 
policies were expressed in terms of cultural and economic 
political beliefs, we also include a measure of ideological 
identification. This measure is one of the most often used 
measures to test social psychological hypotheses about polit-
ical beliefs (e.g., Jost, 2006), including those regarding threat 
(e.g., Jost et al., 2017). It helps address the basic claim made 
by some that right-wing beliefs are a general antidote to 
threat (e.g., Hibbing et al., 2014). Past work finds more simi-
larities between ideological identification and cultural politi-
cal beliefs than economic political beliefs (Malka et al., 
2014), suggesting that the associations between threat and 
ideological identification will be similar to the associations 
between threat and cultural political beliefs. In short, our 
study helped us test if the association between threat and 
politics depends on the type of threat, the political domain, 
and the country when simultaneously assessed.
Method
Participants and Procedure
We used data from the 6th wave of the World Values Survey 
(1981–2014) which includes representative samples from 
around the world collected between 2010 and 2014. After 
excluding participants who did not complete the threat mea-
sures and at least one of the political measures, our analyses 
included data from 60,378 participants (49% men, 51% 
women, 0.0003% missing gender data, mean age = 41.5 
years, SD = 16.1) from 56 countries (mean N/country = 
1,078, SD = 456). We have 80% power to detect a correla-
tion of .09 in a country with the average sample size. Table 
S1 in the Supplemental Material includes a complete list of 
country sample sizes. We have 80% power to detect a corre-
lation of .13 in the country with the smallest sample size 
(Turkey, n = 481).
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Measures
Political beliefs. The data contained seven political beliefs 
related to the economic domain and the cultural domain, as 
well as people’s ideological self-identification as left-wing or 
right-wing (see Table 2). All of the items are the same as the 
items used by Malka and colleagues’ (2019) work on the 
structure of political beliefs across countries, with one excep-
tion. Malka and colleagues (2019) used an item asking partici-
pants about their views of immigration on a scale ranging from 
“Let anyone come who wants to” to “Prohibit people coming 
here from other countries.” However, this item was only avail-
able in a limited number of countries. To maximize coverage, 
we chose an item about immigration that was available in 
more countries. All political items were coded such that higher 
scores indicated more right-wing positions and lower scores 
indicated more left-wing positions on those issues.
We used exploratory principle axis factor analysis with 
the country-mean centered variables (to remove between-
country variance) to reduce the number of political items 
(full description and the correlation matrix used for the factor 
analysis is in the Supplemental Material). We identified five 
components. Three are theoretically sensible factors with 
multiple items. Two items did not load well on any of the 
factors and we treated these items as separate measures. 
Although the items about jobs for men and immigrants have 
some economic content (i.e., jobs), we classified them con-
ceptually as a cultural belief because these items appear to be 
about protecting traditional societal structures (gender roles) 
and the cultural ingroup. See Table 2 for the items, their divi-
sion into scales, and the mean, standard deviation, and range 
of the scales’ reliability across countries. All multi-item 
scales were constructed by averaging together the items.
Threat. Fourteen items were available to measure threat (see 
Table 3). These items are similar to items used to measure 
threat in past work (e.g., Huddy et al., 2005), with the addi-
tion of items about surveillance and police-related threats. 
We used exploratory principle axis factor analyses with the 
country-mean centered variables (to remove between-coun-
try variance) to reduce the number of threat items (full 
description and the correlation matrix used for the factor 
analyses is in the Supplemental Material). We identified 
five theoretically sensible factors, with the addition of the 
surveillance threat item assessing a sixth threat. See Table 3 
for the items, their division into scales, and the mean, stan-
dard deviation, and range of the scales’ reliability across 
countries. All multi-item scales were constructed by averag-
ing together the items.
Country characteristics. The country-level variables that we 
used are listed in Table 1 with their relevant references. 
When multiple years of data were available, we chose the 
value from the year of data collection of the World Value 
Survey (WVS) for that particular country. If this year was not 
available, we chose the value from the closest year (the most 
common deviation was 0 years). To ensure that any effects of 
country characteristics were not due to broad regional simi-
larities (e.g., Kuppens & Pollet, 2014, 2015; Pollet et al., 
2014; Ross & Homer, 1976), we used region as a sum-to-
zero contrast coded covariate (e.g., coding Europe, Sub-
Saharan Africa, etc.). To render coefficients of all of the 
country characteristics comparable, we standardized all of 
the country characteristics to range from 0 to 1. Correlations 
between the country-level characteristics are available in the 
Supplemental Material. Data were not available for all 
countries. Therefore the country-level N ranged from 19 
Table 2. Political Belief Items.
Economic political beliefs
Inequality is okay: M r = .25, SD r = .15, range r = [−.07, .56]
 1 = incomes should be made more equal, 10 = we need larger income differences as incentives for individual effort
 1 = people should take more responsibility to provide for themselves, 10 = the government should take more responsibility to ensure that 
everyone is provided for; reverse scored
Less government ownership:
 1 = private ownership of business and industry should be increased, 10 = government ownership of business and industry should be increased; 
reverse scored
Cultural political beliefs
Social conservatism: M r = .46, SD r = .14, range r = [.15, .73]
 Homosexuality (1 = never justifiable, 10 = always justifiable); reverse scored
 Abortion (1 = never justifiable, 10 = always justifiable); reverse scored
Jobs for high status: M r = .20, SD r = .10, range r = [−.02, .40]
 When jobs are scarce, men should have more right to a job than women (1 = disagree, 2 = neither, 3 = agree)
 When jobs are scarce, employers should give priority to people of this country over immigrants (1 = disagree, 2 = neither, 3 = agree)
Ideological identification
In political matters, people talk of “the left” and “the right.” How would you place your views on this scale, generally speaking?”  
(1 = left, 10 = right).
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(cultural tightness) to 56 (location in Eastern Europe, reli-
gious diversity; median country-level N = 55).
Results
The analysis proceeded in three steps. First, we estimated the 
average associations between the six threats and the five 
political beliefs across countries. Second, we assessed 
whether there was significant between-country variability in 
the associations between each threat and each political belief. 
Third, we tested if each of the country characteristics moder-
ated the link between threat and political beliefs.
Overall Associations Between Threat and Politics
To estimate the overall associations between threat and poli-
tics, we regressed each of the five political belief measures on 
the six threat measures in multilevel models with random 
intercepts and random slopes for the countries (five multi-
level regressions in total). All measures were rescaled to 
range from 0 to 1; this means that the coefficients can be 
interpreted as the proportion difference of the outcome vari-
able between the minimum and maximum of the predictor 
variable (e.g., an effect of .10 is a 10% difference in the politi-
cal variable between the minimum and maximum of the threat 
variable). The threat measures were country-mean centered. 
The models were estimated using lme4 (Bates et al., 2015) 
and lmerTest (Kuznetsova et al., 2017) in R (R Core Team, 
2019). Figures were created using ggplot2 (Wickham, 2016), 
cowplot (Wilke, 2019), and ggrepel (Slowikowski, 2019). 
The coefficient estimates and their confidence intervals are in 
Figure 1.
Our first expectation was that economically relevant 
threats (i.e., economic and poverty threats) would be associ-
ated with more left-wing economic political beliefs. This 
would be supported by negative associations between eco-
nomically relevant threats and the economic political beliefs 
(inequality is okay and less government ownership). Some 
support was found for this expectation (Figure 1, Top Row). 
There were negative associations between both economic 
Table 3. Threat Items.
Violence threat: M α = .89, SD α = .08, range α = [.43, .97]
 To what degree are you worried about the following situations . . . A terrorist attack (1 = not at all, 2 = not much, 3 = a great deal, 4 
= very much)
 To what degree are you worried about the following situations . . . A civil war (1 = not at all, 2 = not much, 3 = a great deal, 4 = very 
much)
 To what degree are you worried about the following situations . . . A war involving my country (1 = not at all, 2 = not much, 3 = a 
great deal, 4 = very much)
Neighborhood threat: M α = .55, SD α = .12, range α = [.15, .75]
 In the last 12 months, how often have you or your family . . . Felt unsafe from crime in your home (1 = often, 2 = sometimes, 3 = 
rarely, 4 = never); reverse scored
 How frequently do the following things occur in your neighborhood? . . . Robberies (1 = very frequently, 2 = quite frequently, 3 = not 
frequently, 4 = not at all frequently); reverse scored
 Could you tell me how secure do you feel these days in your neighborhood? (1 = very secure, 2 = quite secure, 3 = not very secure, 4 
= not at all secure)
Police threat: M r = .48, SD r = .13, range r = [.20, .76]
 How frequently do the following things occur in your neighborhood? . . . Police or military interfere with people’s private life (1 = very 
frequently, 2 = quite frequently, 3 = not frequently, 4 = not at all frequently); reverse scored
 How frequently do the following things occur in your neighborhood? . . . Racist behavior (1 = very frequently, 2 = quite frequently, 3 = 
not frequently, 4 = not at all frequently); reverse scored
Economic threat: M r = .54, SD r = .11, range r = [.24, .71]
 To what degree are you worried about the following situations . . . Not being able to give my children a good education (1 = not at 
all, 2 = not much, 3 = a great deal, 4 = very much)
 To what degree are you worried about the following situations . . . Losing my job or not finding a job (1 = not at all, 2 = not much, 3 
= a great deal, 4 = very much)
Poverty threat: M α = .76, SD α = .08, range α = [.51, .91]
 In the last 12 months, how often have you or your family . . . Gone without medicine or medical treatment that you needed (1 = 
often, 2 = sometimes, 3 = rarely, 4 = never); reverse scored
 In the last 12 months, how often have you or your family . . . Gone without enough food to eat (1 = often, 2 = sometimes, 3 = rarely, 
4 = never); reverse scored
 In the last 12 months, how often have you or your family . . . Gone without a cash income (1 = often, 2 = sometimes, 3 = rarely, 4 = 
never); reverse scored
Surveillance threat:
 To what degree are you worried about the following situations . . . Government wire-tapping or reading my mail or email (1 = not at 
all, 2 = not much, 3 = a great deal, 4 = very much)
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and poverty threat and belief that inequality is okay. There 
was also a negative association between poverty threat and 
the belief that there should be less government ownership. 
However, economic threat was not associated with the belief 
that there should be less government ownership.
Our second expectation was that threats related to vio-
lence (i.e., violence and neighborhood threats) would be 
associated with more right-wing cultural political beliefs. 
There was some support for this expectation (Figure 1, 
Middle Row): Violence threats related positively to both 
measures of cultural political beliefs. Neighborhood threats, 
however, were not related to either measure of cultural politi-
cal beliefs. Consistent with the idea that ideological identifi-
cation is more likely to track cultural political beliefs, 
violence threats were associated with more right-wing iden-
tification; however, unexpectedly, neighborhood threats 
were associated with more left-wing identification.
Our third expectation was that threats related to the police 
would be associated with more left-wing cultural political 
beliefs. As expected, experiencing police threats was 
associated with more left-wing cultural political beliefs on 
both indicators of cultural political beliefs (Figure 1, Middle 
Row).
Notably, there were additional significant associations 
between the threats and political beliefs that are not captured 
by our expectations. For example, violence threat was asso-
ciated with more left-wing views on government ownership, 
neighborhood threat was associated with more left-wing 
views on inequality, economic threat was associated with 
more left-wing views on social conservatism, poverty threat 
was associated with more right-wing views on both jobs for 
high status and social conservatism, and surveillance threat 
was associated with more right-wing views on government 
ownership. In total, there were six significant association 
between right-wing beliefs and threat, nine significant asso-
ciations between left-wing beliefs and threat, and 15 esti-
mates that were not significantly different from zero. The 
idea that more threat is associated with more right-wing 
beliefs does not hold when considering multiple threats and 
multiple political beliefs.
Figure 1. Estimates of the associations and 95% confidence intervals between threat and political beliefs.
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Variation in Threat-Politics Association Between 
Countries
The results of the overall analysis are informative, but it 
averages across any between-country variation. To test if 
there is significant variation in the associations across coun-
try, we tested the significance of the random slopes. To do 
this, we first estimated the same models as presented in 
Figure 1, but without any random slopes (only a random 
intercept). Then, we estimated a model that included the ran-
dom slope for one of the six threats. Finally, we compared 
the fit of the two models (no random slopes vs. one random 
slope) using the ANOVA function in R to assess if each indi-
vidual slope had significant variation across countries. In all 
cases, the model including the random slope fit the data bet-
ter (all ps < .001) indicating significant variation. We can 
also compare the model with all random slopes (i.e., the 
model in Figure 1) to the model without any random slopes. 
The model with all random slopes also fit the data better than 
the model without any random slopes (p < .001). Across all 
threat-politics associations, there is significant variation 
across countries.
To visualize this variation, we have plotted the estimated 
slope for each country in Figures 2 to 6. Each figure is a 
different political belief. Each panel in each figure is a dif-
ferent threat. And each line in each panel is the estimated 
slope for each country. The countries with the two largest 
and the two smallest slopes are highlighted and labeled. 
The United States is also highlighted and labeled as a refer-
ence point. The title of each panel also includes the range of 
the slopes in the panel and the proportion of the slopes that 
are positive. The estimated slopes for each country can be 
found in Tables S5 to S9 in the Supplemental Material.
Figures 2 to 6 reveal that the findings for one country do 
not necessarily apply to the findings in another country. For 
example, Figure 6 plots the results for ideological identifica-
tion. If we would have only included the United States and 
only focused on violence threat, we would have concluded 
that threat is associated with more right-wing political beliefs 
(b = .13). However, when we expand our analysis to other 
countries, the link between violence threat and right-wing 
beliefs can be quite different (range b = [–.10, .16]). The 
effect in Kazakhstan is nearly as strong as the effect in the 
United States, but in the opposite direction (b = –.10). Even 
maintaining our focus on the United States, by shifting our 
focus to other types of threats leads to different conclusions. 
The link between threat and right-wing ideological identifica-
tion in the United States is estimated to be small and negative 
Figure 2. Estimated slopes between threat and inequality is okay for each country.
Note. The two largest and two smallest slopes are highlighted and labeled. The United States is also highlighted and labeled for comparison purposes. See 
also Table S5.
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for every other threat we examined (range b = [–.05, –.02]). 
That is, if we would have limited our focus to violence threat 
and ideological identification our results would be consistent 
with the positive association between threat and politics 
assumed in the literature (e.g., Jost et al., 2003, 2017); how-
ever, if we expand beyond the United States or to different 
types of threats the results are inconsistent (and sometimes 
contrary) to this assumption. Similar comparisons can be 
made for each of the political beliefs we studied (e.g., by 
using the estimated slopes in the Supplemental Material).
Country Characteristics
The relationship between perceived threat and political 
beliefs is not consistent across countries. What explains this 
variation? To explore this question, we built on the multi-
level models from Figure 1. We regressed each of the five 
political beliefs onto the six threats (country-mean centered) 
and their interaction with one of the country characteristics 
(grand-mean centered). We also controlled for region to rule 
out shared regional features that may be confounded with the 
feature of interest (Kuppens & Pollet, 2015). We included a 
random intercept for country and random slopes for threats. 
That is, in each multilevel regression we predicted the 
political belief with the six threats, the interaction between 
the six threats and the focal country characteristic, and 
region. The interactions are tests of whether or not the threat-
politics association differs across countries. Thus, we model 
a cross-level interaction, using the different country charac-
teristics (i.e., a country-level variable; see Table 1) to explain 
variation in the relation between threat and political beliefs at 
the individual-level. We do so to see the extent that country 
characteristic (e.g., government quality) affects the way that 
an individual’s political beliefs are related to their percep-
tions of threat. In total, we estimated 130 multilevel regres-
sion models (five political beliefs × 26 country 
characteristics) that tested 780 interactions (six threats × 
130 regressions). The 780 interaction coefficients are in 
Figure 7. We adopted a Holm’s correction (Holm, 1979) for 
the p values. We applied the correction to the p values for 
each threat × political belief combination (i.e., each row in 
Figure 7) using the p.adjust function in R.3
The modal result was a nonsignificant association between 
the country characteristic and threat. Of the 780 interaction 
coefficients 45 (6%) were significant at p < .05, 23 (3%) 
were significant at p < .01, and eight (1%) were significant 
at p < .001 (all when applying the Holm correction for each 
row). The highest number of significant interactions for any 
Figure 3. Estimated slopes between threat and less government ownership for each country.
Note. The two largest and two smallest slopes are highlighted and labeled. The United States is also highlighted and labeled for comparison purposes. See 
also Table S6.
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country characteristic was five (Democratic Governance, 
Individualism [Minkov], Governance Quality). Nine country 
characteristics never significantly interacted with any threats 
(Gini index, Workplace diversity [language], International 
migrant stock, Religious Diversity, Cultural Tightness, 
Percent Agriculture, Percent Industry, Climate Index).
The country characteristics appeared to do a better job 
explaining variation in the association between threats and 
social conservatism (29 significant interactions) than in 
explaining variation between threats and any of the other 
political beliefs (16 significant interactions across the 
remaining political beliefs). Overall, we found few country 
characteristics that consistently helped explain variation in 
the link between threat and political beliefs. All significant 
interactions are plotted and can be found in the Supplemental 
Material.
Digging Deeper Into Specific Country 
Characteristics
Table 1 highlights several country characteristics for which we 
had stronger expectations. Specifically, we expected that indi-
cators of government effectiveness (Corruption Perception 
Index, Government Effectiveness Index, Governance Quality, 
and Democratic Governance Index), whether a country was a 
former member of the Eastern bloc, indicators of poor eco-
nomic conditions (HDI, Gini Index, and Gender Inequality 
Index), and ideological constraint would help explain varia-
tion in the association between threat and political beliefs. We 
dig deeper into each of these country characteristics in the 
Supplemental Material and summarize those analyses here.
Government effectiveness. We anticipated that threat may be 
more strongly associated with political beliefs that give gov-
ernments power, such as left-wing economic political beliefs, 
when a country had a well-functioning government. The 
only significant interaction effects between threat and coun-
try characteristics related to government effectiveness (see 
Table 1) when predicting economic political belief was for 
surveillance threat when predicting the belief that inequality 
is okay (see Figure 7). This negative interaction emerged for 
three of the government indicators; we report the simple 
slopes in text for the governance quality indicator. The sim-
ple slopes did not show support for the hypothesis. At high 
(+1 SD) levels of governance quality, the effect of surveil-
lance threat was not significant (b = −0.01, SE = 0.01, p = 
.32). At low (−1 SD) levels of governance quality the effect 
was positive (b = 0.03, SE = 0.01, p < .001). This indicates 
Figure 4. Estimated slopes between threat and jobs for high status for each country.
Note. The two largest and two smallest slopes are highlighted and labeled. The United States is also highlighted and labeled for comparison purposes. See 
also Table S7.
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surveillance threat are associated with a more right-wing 
position on the inequality is okay measure when governance 
quality is low, but it is unrelated to the inequality is okay 
measure when governance quality is high. There were no 
other significant interactions between threats and govern-
ment effectiveness when predicting economic political 
beliefs. Our expectation was unsupported.
Eastern Bloc. We expected that threat may be more likely 
associated with left-wing economic political beliefs in coun-
tries from the former Eastern Bloc where state intervention 
in the economy was the norm. The interactions for both vio-
lence threat and poverty threat when predicting government 
ownership support this idea. The link between these threats 
and beliefs about less government ownership are negative in 
the former Eastern Bloc (violence threat b = −0.11, SE = 
0.02, p < .001; poverty threat b = −0.15, SE = 0.03, p < 
.001) indicating that these threats are associated with left-
wing economic beliefs in this context. The estimate for these 
same threats are closer to zero outside of the former Eastern 
Bloc (violence threat b = −0.008, SE = 0.01, p = .55; pov-
erty threat b = −0.03, SE = 0.01, p = .03). There was also a 
positive interaction for economic threat when predicting 
government ownership that is opposite to the prediction; 
economic threat is positively associated with government 
ownership in the former Eastern Bloc (b = 0.07, SE = 0.02, 
p = .001) and near zero outside of it (b = −0.02, SE = 0.01, 
p = .10). There were no other significant interactions 
between threat and being a member of the Eastern Bloc. Our 
expectation was largely unsupported.
Threatening economic conditions. We anticipated that threat 
may be less strongly associated with right-wing political 
beliefs when economic conditions are poor. There was little 
evidence for such effects. There were no interactions with the 
Gini Index. There was a negative interaction between eco-
nomic threat and the HDI when predicting social conserva-
tism, opposite predictions. It showed that at high (+1 SD) 
levels of HDI the effect of economic threat was associated 
with left-wing views (b = −0.06, SE = 0.01, p < .001), but at 
low (−1 SD) levels of HDI the effect of economic threat was 
near zero (b = 0.008, SE = 0.01, p = .52). Consistent with 
expectations, there was a positive interaction between the 
HDI and poverty threat when predicting social conservatism. 
This suggests that poverty threat is associated with right-wing 
views on social conservatism (b = 0.06, SE = 0.01, p < .001) 
Figure 5. Estimated slopes between threat and social conservatism for each country.
Note. The two largest and two smallest slopes are highlighted and labeled. The United States is also highlighted and labeled for comparison purposes. See 
also Table S8.
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in countries with higher scores on the HDI; however, in coun-
tries with lower scores poverty threat is weakly associated 
with left-wing views on social conservatism (b = −0.03, SE 
= 0.01, p = .03). The interaction between the Gender Inequal-
ity Index and poverty threat when predicting social conserva-
tism is also consistent with predictions. At high (+1 SD) 
levels of gender inequality the effect of poverty threat on 
social conservatism is near zero (b = −0.03, SE = 0.01, p = 
.08), but at low (–1SD) levels of gender inequality poverty 
threat is associated with more right-wing views (b = 0.06, SE 
= 0.01, p < .001). However, these two interactions were the 
only indicators of support for our expectation; the primary 
result for all combinations of threat and political beliefs was 
no significant interaction. Our expectation was largely 
unsupported.
Ideological constraint. We anticipated that threat may be more 
likely to be associated with right-wing economic political 
beliefs in countries with more ideological constraint. For eco-
nomic political beliefs, there was one positive interaction with 
violence threat when predicting less government ownership, 
however, it was not supportive of the predictions. The effect of 
violence threat was unrelated to less government ownership at 
high (+1 SD) constraint (b = 0.01, SE = .02, p = .44). At low 
(−1 SD) constraint, violence threat was associated with left-
wing views (b = −0.07, SE = .02, p < .001). All other possi-
ble interactions were not significant or were for cultural 
political beliefs. Our expectation was unsupported.
Discussion
Threat is often associated with right-wing political beliefs in 
political and social psychological theory (Adorno et al., 1950; 
Conway et al., 2020; Jost et al., 2003). Here we sought to 
explore how this direct association may be more nuanced after 
taking into account variation in different types of political 
beliefs, different types of threat, and different countries. 
Overall, we found that the link between threat and political 
beliefs varied across types of political beliefs, different types of 
threat, and different countries. This suggests that theories that 
expect right-wing political beliefs to be primarily, or even typi-
cally, associated with threat are incomplete. To fully account 
for variation in this relationship, we need to take types of politi-
cal beliefs, types of threat, and countries into account. Only 
taking one of these factors into account cannot account for the 
variation in the relationship between threat and political beliefs.
Figure 6. Estimated slopes between threat and ideological identification for each country.
Note. The two largest and two smallest slopes are highlighted and labeled. The United States is also highlighted and labeled for comparison purposes. See 
also Table S9.
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Although we identified differences between countries, we 
did not find much evidence for what accounts for these dif-
ferences. We tested a large set of 26 country characteristics 
that we thought might play a role, including characteristics 
based on past research and a variety of other more explor-
atory variables. The most consistent result was that we were 
not able to explain much of the variation in the association 
between threat and political beliefs between countries. For 
example, there was some evidence that threat is less likely to 
be associated with right-wing beliefs in countries with poorer 
economic condition (Sibley et al., 2012), but there was 
also evidence directly in contrast to these findings and many 
null results that cannot be interpreted strongly. Similarly 
inconsistent results were found when we tested if quality 
government, ideological constraint, and being a part of the 
former Eastern Bloc accounted for variation across coun-
tries. Although there were some significant effects, overall, 
these factors did not play much of a role and produced results 
Figure 7. Estimates for the interaction between-ountry characteristics (x-axis) and threats (y-axis) for the five measures of political 
beliefs (row chunks).
Note. Estimates that are significant using the Holm’s correction are highlighted with geometric shapes. For example, the interaction between corruption 
perceptions (x-axis) and surveillance threat (y-axis) when predicting ideology (bottom row chunk) is −.04 and is nonsignificant (no geometric shape). The 
interaction between corruption perceptions (x-axis) and poverty threat (y-axis) when predicting social conservatism (second to bottom row chunk) is .18 
and is significant a p < .001 (diamond geometric shape).
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both consistent and inconsistent with expectations in Table 1. 
One possibility is that more specific historical circumstances 
or country-specific elite’s rhetorical links between threat and 
political beliefs may help explain the variation in the links 
between threat and political beliefs across countries.
The overall associations between economic and violence-
related threats and political beliefs were generally (but not per-
fectly) consistent with expectations. Threats of violence were 
associated with cultural right-wing beliefs and economic 
threats were associated with left-wing economic political 
beliefs. This is consistent with prior findings that threat tends 
to inspire political beliefs that are perceived to help address the 
threat (e.g., Duckitt & Sibley, 2009; Eadeh & Chang, 2019) 
and turn to their ingroup when faced with threat (e.g., Voci, 
2006). We had fewer expectations for surveillance and police 
threats because these types of threat were not considered by 
past literature. Here we found that the surveillance threat was 
associated with right-wing beliefs about government owner-
ship. We found that police threat was associated with more 
left-wing cultural political beliefs, but was unrelated to eco-
nomic political beliefs. Of course, as indicated in Figures 2 to 
6, all of these effects were not consistent across countries.
Implications and Future Directions
The finding that the link between threat and political beliefs 
depends on the type of threat, type of belief, and the country 
suggests that models that posit a clear link between feelings of 
threat and right-wing political beliefs (e.g., Hibbing et al., 
2014; Jost et al., 2003) are incomplete. It is necessary to under-
stand at least three sources of variation to understand how 
threat is associated with politics. Although prominent 
approaches, like the motivated social cognition approach to 
threat and ideology (Jost et al., 2003), in practice focus on a 
direct link between threat and politics, a broader theoretical 
interpretation of this work suggests a way forward. Specifically, 
these approaches suggest that people adopt political beliefs 
that fulfill their psychological needs (such as to address feel-
ings of threat). This general insight may still hold. The aspect 
that likely does not hold is that right-wing beliefs are best 
suited to address all types of threat and do so to an equal degree 
in all countries. This means that future work aimed at develop-
ing a theory of the links between threat and political beliefs 
needs to identify if and how the same belief (e.g., that income 
inequality is okay) addresses diverse threats differently across 
different countries. A primary implication of our work is that 
this is a necessary task for all scholars with such theoretical 
ambitions. One way forward, may be with affordance-based 
models of the threat-politics association (e.g., Eadeh & Chang, 
2019). These models posit that people adopt political beliefs 
that are best perceived as fixing a particular threat with the 
explicit acknowledgment that this will differ across types of 
threat, types of beliefs, and countries.
A theory of threat and politics is not the only direction 
scholars can take. Another fruitful direction is to zoom in on 
specific threats in specific contexts with the aim of explain-
ing these more local relationships (e.g., the links between 
poverty threat and politics in the United Kingdom). Although 
this approach may not uncover a universal explanation for 
the link between threat and politics, it will likely provide a 
variety of insightful information. In particular, scholars 
should focus on threats that are not typically studied and 
integrate this work into political psychological approaches. 
For example, both surveillance and police threats are under-
studied, but both threats are highly relevant (see, e.g., 
Kodapanakkal et al., 2020). There is an increasing amount of 
surveillance in daily life and protests against such surveil-
lance (e.g., in Hong Kong; Yu, 2019), moreover, police bru-
tality has received intense scrutiny in some countries (e.g., 
the United States; Burch et al., 2020). Future studies should 
investigate diverse types of threat, including threats of gov-
ernment surveillance and police abuse.
Another possible direction that could also benefit from a 
more narrow approach, is to integrate work on threat and poli-
tics with the work on threat and challenge responses. Although 
not typically discussed in political psychology, this work sug-
gests that some people respond differently to the same threat 
depending on the amount of resources that they have (e.g., 
Skinner & Brewer, 2002; Tomaka et al., 1993). If people have 
the resources to cope with the threat, it may be seen as more of 
a challenge that leads people to adopt a proactive and open-
minded approach to addressing the threat. If people do not 
have sufficient resources, people may see the threat as more of 
a prototypical threat and become more risk-averse and closed-
minded when addressing the threat. Although this might sug-
gest that threats leads people with sufficient resources to 
become more left-wing, it is not clear that this is the correct 
conceptual and theoretical mapping between the two research 
areas. For example, when experiencing a poverty threat with-
out sufficient resources it is not clear that taking right-wing 
positions on economic issues (which may increase risk in this 
domain) would be an effective coping mechanism. An integra-
tion of these literatures could be fruitful.
More practically, our findings hint that it is not necessarily 
the case that right-wing parties and other right-wing organiza-
tions will always benefit from perceived threat. Threat may be 
able to also push people to the left. For the enterprising politi-
cian who wants to take advantage of such findings, we think 
our results suggest that it is more important to be seen as solv-
ing a threat than as holding a particular type of belief. Of 
course, our work is just a start and not able to address this issue 
in full. Future research on how politicians leverage different 
types of threat to extract support for different types of policies 
could be a natural extension of our work into the field.
Limitations
All of our analyses are based on cross-sectional data. Although 
we expect the relationships between threat and politics to be 
bi-directional (e.g., Jost et al., 2003), we cannot confirm nor 
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disconfirm the causal direction between threat and political 
beliefs. Results should be interpreted as such. This is a limita-
tion of relying on available data without the necessary longitu-
dinal or experimental components that help to establish 
causality (a limitation shared with many of the studies used in 
meta-analyses on the topic; Jost et al., 2003, 2017).
Another limitation is that we could not choose our own 
measures. This meant relying on some measures with lower 
reliability, which may have attenuated the estimated rela-
tions. Additional indicators of threat or political beliefs may 
also reveal additional sources of variation. We were able to 
adopt measures of political beliefs used in prior studies (e.g., 
Malka et al., 2014, 2017), which helps our data maintain 
comparability with other data in this domain. One obvious 
shortcoming is that one measure of cultural political beliefs 
(jobs for high status) clearly has some overlap with economic 
political beliefs, making it a bit of a mix between cultural and 
economic political beliefs. That said, economic threats were 
unrelated to these beliefs suggesting that the overlap with 
economic was not an obvious confounding factor. Moreover, 
the measure of social conservatism does not have the same 
shortcoming. We were also able to measure more types of 
threat than are typical in the literature. Unfortunately, these 
threats may not be specifically linked with political beliefs as 
some perspectives might require for a strict test (e.g., Eadeh 
& Chang, 2019). At the same time, some of our threat mea-
sures might be seen as too overlapping with the political 
belief measures (e.g., poverty threat and poverty-relevant 
policy), leading us to overestimate the link between these 
threats and policies. However, if this were the case, we would 
not expect such extreme variation across contexts because 
the overlap would be similar in each place. Moreover, the 
ideology identification measure has no such issues.
Nonetheless, we think the data will still be informative to 
multiple theories of threat and politics. In particular, the key 
benefit of our data source is that we could focus on more 
countries than are typically studied when assessing the asso-
ciation between multiple types of threat and multiple types of 
political beliefs. This helps us identify variation in the link 
between threat and politics across countries, consistent with 
recent calls to diversify our samples and stimuli in political 
psychology (Brandt & Wagemans, 2017). Nonetheless, the 
number of countries was still small from the perspective of 
statistical power (max N = 56), which translated into low 
statistical power for identifying effects of country character-
istics. Finally, like any study on politics, the results may also 
be affected by specific historical circumstances. This addi-
tional source of variation may further help explain the link 
between diverse types of threat and diverse political beliefs.
Conclusion
Political beliefs and perceptions of threat are linked, but the 
relationship is nuanced. We found that the threat-politics link 
depends on at least three sources of variation: the type of 
political belief, the type of threat, and the political system. 
We also explored if a broad set of country characteristics 
could account for variation in the threat-politics link across 
countries. This analysis revealed few consistent results. 
Across all of the results, the data appear most consistent with 
affordance-based approaches to threat and politics (Eadeh & 
Chang, 2019), which suggests that people adopt political 
beliefs that best help address their feelings of threat.
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Notes
1. We believe that there is a high likelihood of a reciprocal rela-
tionship between threat and political beliefs (e.g., Choma & 
Hodson, 2017; Onraet et al., 2014); however, we discuss threat 
as a cause of political beliefs because this is the primary way 
that theories in this area have conceived of the relationship. 
There is evidence for this causal direction (Onraet et al., 2014; 
Thórisdóttir & Jost, 2011).
2. Details on these measures are available in the “Methods” section.
3. The same figure, but using uncorrected p values is Figure S1. If 
the Holm’s correction is applied to all of the estimates in Figure 
7, no finding is significant.
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